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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
vs. : Appeal No. 920550-CA 
KERRY B. BAKER, : 
Category 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this case pursuant to UCA 
Annotated 78-2-2(3)(i) and Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Annotated 7 6-6-410, Theft by Gross Deviation of a 
Rental Agreement. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the Defendant's plea was entered in this case 
knowingly and voluntarily by the Defendant. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the Second Judicial District Court's 
acceptance of Defendant's guilty plea entered to the offense of 
Third Degree Felony Theft, UCA Section 76-6-410 on the 8th day of 
July, 1992. 
Kerry Baker was arraigned in the Second Circuit Court of Weber 
County on the 18th day of June, 1992 for the offenses of Theft by 
Gross Deviation of a Rental Agreement, a Third Degree Felony, Theft 
by Gross Deviation of a Rental Agreement, a Class A Misdemeanor, 
and Theft by Gross Deviation of a Rental Agreement, a Class B 
Misdemeanor. 
At the Arraignment the Defendant was interviewed by the Public 
Defender's Office and found to qualify for their services. A 
Preliminary Hearing was scheduled for the 26th day of June, 1992. 
At the Preliminary Hearing the defense counsel and Defendant 
had an opportunity to review the evidence that would be presented 
by the State, including interviewing the witnesses present for that 
hearing. At that time the Defendant determined to waive the 
Preliminary Hearing and a negotiation was made with the State of 
Utah that the Defendant would enter a plea of guilty to the Third 
Degree Felony and the other two (2) cases would be dismissed. 
On the 8th day of July, 1992 the Defendant appeared in the 
Second Judicial District Court before the Honorable Judge Parley 
Baldwin and at that time was again arraigned on the charge of Theft 
by Gross Deviation of a Rental Agreement, a Third Degree Felony. 
The Court was advised that the Defendant would be entering a 
guilty plea and the Court reviewed in detail the Defendant's rights 
and indicated that a plea entered at that time would waive those 
rights. 
The Defendant also reviewed a Statement by Defendant in 
Advance of a Plea read to him by Attorney Martin Gravis and 
Defendant signed the same indicating that he had it read to him and 
understood its contents. 
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A plea of guilty was entered and sentencing was set for the 
29th day of July, 1992. At the time of sentencing the Defendant 
was sentenced to serve a term in the Utah State Prison from 0-5 
years and to pay restitution in the amount of $641.14 for the 
offenses. 
This is an appeal of Defendant's conviction and prison 
sentence and is based upon Defendant's allegations that he entered 
the plea under a promise from defense counsel, Bernard L. Allen, 
that he would not go to Prison and would only serve jail time with 
work release. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 4th day of December, 1990 the Defendant entered into an 
agreement with Action Rental whereupon the Defendant agreed to rent 
a tv, bed and headboard and chest for the respective monthly rental 
fees of $50.06, $43.39 and $11.13 per month. 
At that time the Defendant signed Rental Agreements on each of 
the three (3) items agreeing to make said payments and further 
agreed by initially the block that he would not dispose of the 
property through sale or through pawning the items rented. 
The Defendant further contracted that he would allow the 
property removed from the location known by Action Rental. (See 
copies of Rental Agreement attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and made 
a part hereof by reference.) 
According to the proprietor of the Action Rental store wherein 
this Contract was entered, Mr. Baker was sporadic in making the 
agreed upon rental payments and that finally some time after May of 
3 
1991 the representative of Action Rental appeared for the purpose 
of recovering the items rented. 
Action Rental was able to recover other items that were rented 
on the same day, but the tv, bed and headboard and chest were not 
to be seen. According to the agent of Action Rental, Geoff Scott, 
Mr. Baker indicated to him that the property had been sold and was 
no longer available to Action Rental. 
Apparently further efforts were made by Action Rental to 
recover the money for these items of property, however, these 
efforts were unsuccessful and Informations were filed against the 
Defendant as indicated above on approximately October 22, 1991. 
The Defendant was taken into custody on or about the 16th day 
of June, 1992 whereupon he was appointed counsel due to his 
indigence and Preliminary Hearing was scheduled for the 2 6th day of 
June, 1992. 
At the Preliminary Hearing Attorney Bernard L. Allen 
represented the Defendant and had an opportunity to review with the 
Defendant the statements made by witnesses in the police reports 
and to discuss with the witnesses their affirmation of those 
statements. Defense counsel and Defendant were aware of 
Defendant's previous criminal record which included a prior prison 
conviction and the fact that the Defendant was currently on parole 
out of the State of Washington, although counsel had been notified 
that the State of Washington was no longer interested in having Mr. 
Baker return to their jurisdiction. 
4 
Arrangements for the entry of a guilty plea to the Third 
Degree Felony were made and the hearing was set for Arraignment in 
the District Court on the 8th day of July, 1992. Attorney Allen 
prepared the appropriate Statement by Defendant in Advance of Plea 
to be used as the entry of plea, but because of other required 
Court appearances was not present at the Arraignment of the 
Defendant. 
Mr. Baker was represented by Attorney Martin Gravis, who 
pursuant to the notes prepared by Attorney Allen, proceeded to 
review with the Defendant all his rights pursuant to a Statement by 
Defendant in Advance of Plea, which explains to Defendant all 
constitutional rights, including under Paragraph 10 "no agreements 
have been reached, nor representations have been made to me as to 
what the sentence will be" and under Paragraph 11 which refers to 
the possible maximum sentence imposed upon a guilty plea, which in 
this case was 0-5 years in prison. 
In a second portion of the Agreement, the Defendant agrees 
under Paragraph 2 that "no threats or promises of any sort have 
been made to me to induce me or to dissuade me to enter this plea" 
and under Paragraph 3 "no one has told me that I would receive 
probation or any other form of leniency because of my plea". 
Prior to presenting his guilty plea to the Court Judge Baldwin 
reviewed with Mr. Baker his constitutional rights, including his 
review of the Statement by Defendant in Advance of Plea and asked 
(Tp. 4, line 8) 
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The Court: O.K., but you have gone through the Plea Agreement with 
Mr. Gravis? 
Mr. Baker: Yes. 
The Court: And you understand that. 
Judge Baldwin reviewed with the Defendant the elements of the 
offense and Mr. Baker indicated that he understood the elements 
that would have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. (Tp. 6, 
line 15) 
The Court also asked the Defendant regarding any outside 
promises made to him by anyone. (Tp. 8, line 4-21) 
The Court: Have any promises been made to you? 
Mr. Baker: No. 
The Court: Mr. Baker? 
Mr. Baker: No. 
The Court: Are you doing this voluntarily without any duress from 
anyone? 
Mr. Baker: Yes. 
The Court: Do you understand that any agreements that may have 
been represented are not binding on this Court in terms of 
sentencing? You understand that? 
Mr. Baker: Yes. 
The Court: Are there any questions that you want to ask? 
Mr. Baker: No. 
The Court: Are you in fact guilty of what you have been charged 
with? 
Mr. Baker: Yes. 
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The Court accepted the plea after ascertaining that the 
Defendant was certain of his constitutional rights and aware that 
he was waiving those rights by entering a plea and making an 
attempt to ascertain that the plea was entered voluntarily and 
knowingly. The Class A and Class B Misdemeanors were also 
dismissed at that time. 
Defendant was referred to the Probation Department for a 
Presentence Report and Sentencing was scheduled for the 29th day of 
July, 1992. At the time of sentencing on the 29th day of July, 
1992, the Defendant was again represented by Attorney Martin Gravis 
who was with the Defendant at the time of plea was entered. 
Mr. Baker, through Attorney Gravis, first stated his intention 
to wait for Attorney Allen to be present for sentencing, however, 
in open Court Mr. Baker indicated that it was acceptable to him to 
have Mr. Gravis handle the sentencing hearing. (Tp. 11, line 12) 
The Presentence Report was not favorable due to Mr. Baker's 
prior criminal record, which included a term in Prison and the fact 
that Defendant had on numerous occasions, violated his probation 
agreements in the past. (Tp. 12, line 7, 24, Tp. 13, line 3) 
At the time set for sentencing, Mr. Baker, for the first time 
brought up the assertion that his attorney had promised that he 
would not serve prison time as a result of his guilty plea. 
Mr. Baker: "Well, Bernie Allen promised me one thing, he told me 
I ain't going to Prison. That he would try to get me a work 
release and do some jail time. If I do well, go to Prison, or a 
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lot of jail time, I ain't payin1 no restitution, you know. I did 
time for it." 
Defendant was in fact sentenced to a term in the Utah State 
Prison not to exceed five (5) years and was ordered to pay 
restitution in the amount of $641.14. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT FULLY COMPLYING 
WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 11 AND BY 
FAILING TO ASCERTAIN A FACTUAL BASIS FOR SAID 
PLEA OF GUILTY. 
The Trial Court's pre-plea inquiry did not comply with the 
requirements of Rule 11(5)(g) as the Defendant was not advised of 
the thirty (30) day limitation for his filing of a Motion to 
Withdraw the Plea. The Court also failed to extract from the 
Defendant or his counsel the factual basis for the entry of said 
guilty plea. 
POINT II 
THE DEFENDANT'S PLEA WAS MADE UNDER IMPROPER 
INDUCEMENT FROM COUNSEL AND WAS THEREFORE NOT 
KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY ENTERED. 
The Defendant's plea to the charge in the present case was not 
knowingly or voluntarily made due to the Defendant's assertion that 
he had been promised by defense counsel that his sentence to the 
charge would not include Prison, but only some jail time with 
potential work release. Such a guarantee, if made, would 
constitute undue influence or improper inducement and effectively 
remove the voluntary and knowing entry of Defendant's plea. Thus, 
the Defendant's Fifth Amendment protection against self 
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incrimination and due process protection afforded by the U.S. 
Constitution as well as Article I, Section 7 and 12 of the Utah 
Constitution have been violated. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The United States Constitution under the Fifth Amendment and 
as applied to the various states by the Fourteenth Amendment 
provides that "No person. . .shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived,of liberty 
without due process of law. . .". 
The Utah Constitution under Article I, Section 5 also provides 
a criminal Defendant with due process protection before any 
deprivation of liberty can be imposed. Further, in Section 12, 
"Rights of Accused Person" include not being "compelled to give 
evidence against himself". 
The Defendant, Kerry Baker, entered a plea of guilty to the 
charge of Theft, a 3rd Degree Felony. The proclamation of guilt 
was clearly an act of self-incrimination and as such his statement 
was an act protected by both the State and Federal Constitution as 
indicated above. It is therefore incumbent upon the Court in 
accepting such a guilty plea to clearly ascertain whether the 
incriminating plea in entered knowingly and voluntarily. 
State v. Gardner, 230 P2d 559, (Utah) State v. Crank, 142 P2d 178, 
(Utah) and State v. Breckenridge, 688 P2d 440 (Utah). 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedures outline the 
minimum requirements that the Court must follow in accepting a 
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guilty plea. The case of State v. Smith, 812 P2d 470 (Utah) has 
held that 
"A Trial Courtfs failure to comply strictly 
with this Rule in accepting a guilty or no 
contest plea is good cause as a matter of law 
for the withdrawal of that plea". 
In the instant case, the Court did not strictly comply with 
Section 5(g) of Rule 11 as Judge Baldwin failed to advise the 
Defendant of his thirty (30) day limitation for filing a Motion to 
Withdraw the Plea. Although this limitation was made a part of the 
"Statement by Defendant in Advance of Plea", this has been held to 
be insufficient compliance with Rule 11(5). 
State v. Gibbons, 740 P2d 1309 (Utah) and the case of 
State v. Valencia, 776 P2d 1332 (Utah) which emphatically declares 
that 
"Strict, and not substantial, compliance with 
Subsection (5) is required". 
The Court's failure to so inform the Defendant may have been 
the reason for the Defendant's failure to request a withdrawal of 
plea in this case. 
The Court also failed to require that a factual basis be 
established in open Court to substantiate the appropriate and 
voluntary nature of Defendant's plea. The Smith case further 
requires that: 
"In addition to providing a synopsis of the 
acts constituting the offense, a Trial Court, 
before accepting a guilty or no contest plea, 
should conduct a limited inquiry into the 
evidence proving those acts. However, that 
inquiry need go no further than is necessary 
to assure, as a matter of due process, that 
the plea represents a voluntary and 
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intelligent choice among the alternative 
courses of action open to the Defendant. 
In the present case the record is devoid of any inquiry into 
the evidence and therefore, no factual basis for the plea is ever 
supplied. Without this inquiry according to the language in Smith, 
the Court can't assure that the plea is a voluntary and intelligent 
choice and further violates Defendant's due process protection. 
(See also State v. Macruire, 184 UAR 39 (1992) . 
POINT II 
The Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Thorup, 2 00 UAR 67 
(1992), although holding that the Defendant's plea was voluntary 
and knowingly and upholding the Trial Court's denial of Defendant's 
Motion to Withdraw his Plea also pointed out that 
"The Trial Court's compliance with Rule 11 
does not foreclosure the possibility the Court 
abused its discretion in refusing Defendant's 
Motion is his plea was in fact voluntary." 
In the Thorup case the Defendant had moved to set aside his 
guilty pleas claiming that his plea was entered under undue 
influence from his father and economic coercion from his attorney. 
The Trial Court's ruling emphasized that the Defendant was a 
"middle aged college graduate with considerable exposure to the 
criminal procedures". The Court of Appeals agreed with the Trial 
Court that with this type of Defendant the examination of the 
Defendant by the Court prior to accepting the plea was fully 
adequate and did not warrant withdrawing the plea. 
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In the present case, however, the Defendant is not well 
educated and according to counsel's statements at plea, "He doesn't 
read very well." (Tp. 4 L. 7) As implied by the Court in 
the intelligence and capacity of the Defendant is an issue 
requiring that the pre-plea examination be particularly thorough 
and understandable. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Forsythe, 560 P2d 337 
(Utah), as quoted in Thorup stated, 
"We are in full agreement with the proposition 
that for a plea of guilty to be valid, it must 
appear that the accused had a clear 
understanding of the charge and without undue 
influence, coercion, or improper inducement 
voluntarily entered such a plea." (Id @ 338-
339 emphasis added) 
The Defendant stated at the time of sentencing that his 
attorney had promised him that he would not go to prison, but only 
jail with work release. Although the Defendant was silent 
regarding this at the time of plea and in fact stated to the 
contrary that no additional promises or inducements had been made, 
the Court would have to consider that if these assertions were 
believed that the Defendant was improperly induced into entering 
the plea of guilty in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court did not fully comply with the pre-plea inquiry 
requirements of Rule 11 and therefore failed to ensure that the 
Defendant's plea was voluntarily and knowingly entered and 
Defendant's assertion that he was improperly induced into entering 
this plea are a violation of Defendant's rights against self 
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incrimination and guarantee of due process as provided by both the 
Utah and United States Constitution. The Defendant's conviction 
should be overturned and the case remanded for Trial or further 
proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / 7 day 
SRNARD L. ALLEN 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and correct 
copies of the above and foregoing Appellant's Brief to counsel for 
the Plaintiff, Attorney General's Office, 23 6 State Capitol, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84114, postage prepaid this // day of January, 
1993 
5£4 
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"APPENDIX" 
STATE OF UTAH VS. KERRY B. BAKER 
Affidavit of Impecuniosity 
Case No. 921900334 
PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, INC., 
OF WEBER COUNTY 
2568 Washington Blvd., Suite 203 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Telephone: (801) 392-8247 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT IN 
Plaintiff, : ADVANCE OF PLEA OF GUILTY 
vs. : 
KERRY B. BAKER, : Case No. 
Judge DAVID E. ROTH 
Defendant. : 
I hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been advised of 
the following facts and rights by my attorney, that I understand 
said facts and rights, and that I have had the assistance of 
counsel in reviewing, explaining and completing this form: 
1. The nature of the charges against me have been explained. 
I have had an opportunity to discuss the nature of the charges with 
my attorney, and I understand the charges and the elements of each 
charge which the government is required to prove. 
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STATE OF UTAH vs. KERRY B. BAKER 
Affidavit of Impecuniosity 
Case No. 921900334 
2. As explained, I am charged with crimes in Weber County as 
follows: 
Class or 
Crime Degree Statutory Penalty 
Theft by Rental Agreement 3rd-Degree 0-5 years U.S.P. &/or 
Felony $5,000.00 fine. 
Theft Class "A" up to one year jail 
Misdemeanor $2,500.00 fine. 
Theft Class "B" 0-6 months jail &/or 
Misdemeanor $1,000.00 fine. 
3. The possibility of entering a plea of guilty to the 
charges has been discussed with the prosecutor as follows: 
Class or 
Crime Degree Statutory Penalty 
Theft by Rental Agreement 3rd-degree 0-5 years U.S.P. &/or 
Felony $5,000.00 fine. 
4. I understand that the elements of the offenses I am 
pleading guilty to are: That I exercised unauthorized control over 
the property of another by grossly deviating from the agreed upon 
terms of my rental agreement which resulted in the owners being 
deprived of said property. 
5. I know that I can be represented by an attorney at every 
stage of the proceeding, and I know that if I cannot afford an 
attorney, one will be appointed to represent me. 
6. I know that I have a right to plead "not guilty," and I 
know that if I do plead "not guilty," I can persist in that plea. 
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STATE OF UTAH vs. KERRY B. BAKER 
Affidavit of Impecuniosity 
Case No. 921900334 
7. I know that I have a right to a trial by jury, and that 
if I were to stand trial by a jury: 
a. I have a right to the assistance of counsel at every 
stage of the proceeding. 
b. I have a right to see and observe the witnesses who 
testify against me. 
c. My attorney can cross-examine all witnesses who 
testify against me. 
d. I can call such witnesses as I desire, and I can 
obtain subpoenas to require the attendance and testimony of 
those witnesses. If I cannot afford to pay the witness and 
mileage fees of those witnesses, the government will pay them. 
e. I cannot be forced to incriminate myself and I do 
not have to testify at any trial. 
f. If I do not want to testify, the jury will be told 
that no inference adverse to me may be drawn from my failure 
to testify. 
g. The government must prove each and every element of 
the offenses charged against me beyond a reasonable doubt. 
h. A unanimous verdict of a jury is required to convict 
me. 
i. If I were to be convicted, I can appeal, and if I 
cannot afford the cost of such an appeal, the government will 
pay the costs of the appeal including the services of 
appointed counsel. 
8. Under a plea of guilty, there will not be a trial of any 
kind, and I am waiving my rights listed in the previous paragraph 
and admitting that I am guilty of the crime to which my plea of 
guilty is entered. 
18 
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Affidavit of Impecuniosity 
Case No. 921900334 
9. There is no appellate review of any lawful sentence 
imposed under a plea of guilty. 
10. No agreements have been reached and no representations 
have been made to me as to what the sentence will be. 
11. I know that under the laws of Utah, the possible maximum 
sentence that can and may be imposed upon my plea of guilty to the 
charge identified on page two of this agreement, are set out in 
paragraph three above. I also know that if I am on probation, 
parole or awaiting sentencing upon another offense for which I have 
been convicted or plead guilty, my plea in the present action may 
result in consecutive sentences being imposed upon me. 
12. I know that under a plea of guilty, the judge may ask me 
questions about the offense to which the plea is entered. 
13. The only plea agreement which has been entered into with 
the government is: Upon my plea of guilty to Theft a 3rd-Degree 
Felony the State agrees to dismiss the Theft "A" and Theft "B11 both 
Misdemeanors. 
14. I have a right to ask the Court any questions I wish to 
ask concerning my rights, or about these proceedings and the plea. 
* * * 
I make the following representations to the Court: 
1. I am 3 3 years of age. My education consists of Sepecial 
Education years. I cannot read and understand English. 
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Affidavit of Impecuniosity 
Case No. 921900334 
2. No threats or promises of any sort have been made to me 
to induce me or to persuade me to enter this plea. 
3. No one has told me that I would receive probation or any 
other form of leniency because of my plea. 
4. I understand that I may request to withdraw a plea of 
guilty within 30 days of entry of the plea, but if said request is 
not made within 3 0 days I forfeit this right. A motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty will only be granted upon good cause and 
is within the discretion of the Court. 
5. I have discussed this case and this plea with my lawyer 
as much as I wish to. 
6. I am satisfied with my lawyer. 
7. My decision to enter this plea was made after full and 
careful thought, with the advice of counsel, and with a full 
understanding of my rights, the facts and circumstances of the case 
and the consequences of the plea. I was not under the influence of 
any drugs, medication or intoxicants when the decision to enter the 
plea was made and I am not now under the influence of any drugs, 
medication or intoxicants. 
8. I have no mental reservations concerning the plea. 
DATED this S day of July, 1992. 
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STATE OF UTAH vs. KERRY B. BAKER 
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I certify that I have discussed this statement with the 
Defendant; that I have fully explained his rights and believe that 
he is knowingly and voluntarily entering the plea with full 
knowledge of his legal rights and that there is a factual basis for 
the plea. 
DATED this ^ day of July, 1992. 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
I certify that I have reviewed the Statement of the Defendant 
in Advance of Plea of Guilty and that said statement correctly 
reflects the plea negotiations of the parties. 
DATED this % day of July, 1992. 
DEPUTY WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY 
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Affidavit of Impecuniosity 
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O R D E R 
The signature of the Defendant was acknowledged in the 
presence of the undersigned Judge. 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement by 
Defendant in Advance of Plea of Guilty, the court finds the 
Defendant's plea of guilty is freely and voluntarily made and it is 
ordered that Defendant's plea of "guilty" to the charge(s) set 
forth in the agreement be accepted and entered. 
DONE in Court this day of July, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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IN THE DISTRICT CaURTCogOUETpBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WEBER G0077T7 ' 
Sta te of Utah, -_.- ^ ) JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, AND 
vs . * \ q o ||]i q i c'm I
 1 C COMMITMENT TO UTAH STATE 
BAKER, KERRY B J " ."jl,* f5 PRIS0N 
Defendant. j " "N°: 92190Q3J4 
- - 0 0 O 0 0 - -
JUL 3 l J99^ 
Defendant having been convicted by [la jury; [ 1 the court; iiplea of guilty; 
[]plea of no contest';* of 'the 'offense of "THEFT BY RENTAL AGREEMENT a 
felony of the 3rd degree, being now present iX court and ready for sentence, 
is now adjudicated guilty of the above offense and is now sentenced as follows: 
initials THE BASIC SENTENCE 
i'V /S £] not to exceed five. (5) years, at ..the Utah State Prison; 
[] not less than one (1) year nor more than fifteen (15) years at Utah State Prison; 
[] not less than five (5) years and which may be for life at Utah State Prison; 
[ ] to pay fine in the amount of $ . 
ENHANCED PUNISHMENT FOR FIREARM USE 
Defendant is additionally sentenced as follows: 
[] one (1) year at Utah'State Prison, pursuant to 76-3-203(1) J (2) or (3); 
[ ] not to exceed five (5) years at Utah State Prison pursuant to 76-3-203(1),(2) or (3) 
[ ] not less than five (5) years nor more than ten (10) years at Utah State Prison, 
pursuant to 76-3-203(4); 
said sentence to run consecutive to the basic sentence as set forth above. 
HABITUAL CRIMINAL ALTERNATIVE PUNISHMENT 
Upon a finding that the defendant is in the status of an habitual criminal, the 
defendant is sentenced to: 
[] not less than five (5) years and which may be for life at Utah State Prison. 
RESTITUTION 
(X] Defendant is ordered to pay .restitution m the amount of $641,14 , to 
ACTION T V \ \ . 
~ Defendant is remanded into custody of: 
\ftj h j*] the Sheriff o f . t h i s county, . for del ivery to the Warden or other appropriate 
1 o f f i c ia l a t the Utah Sta te Prison for execution of sentence; or 
[ ] the Warden for execution of th is sentence. 
DATED th i s 2 9 t h day of J u l y _ _ 
•CLERK OF THE COURT x ^ x ^ s p p ^ y k , . . } ; ^ y ^ ^ ^ m i K l T ? v J%$& 
DISTRICT COURT 
v.-•••-'•'Ti'MTY 
•02 RUG 2 1 PP1 3 07 
PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, 
INC., OF WEBER COUNTY 
BERNARD L. ALLEN (#0039) 
2568 Washington Blvd., Suite 203 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Telephone: (801) 392-8247 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
vs. : 
KERRY B. BAKER, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
AUG 2 1 1992 
Case No. 921900334 
JUDGE Oqv^ O (foth 
TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that KERRY B. BAKER, 
Defendant/Appellant, hereby appeals from the judgment rendered in 
this action, wherein the Defendant/Appellant was convicted of Theft 
a 3rd-Degree Felony on July 29, 1992. 
DATED this .-~>y day of August, 1992. 
BERNARD L. ALLEN 
Attorney-, for Defendant/Appellant 
BERNARD L. ALLEN (#0039) 
Attorney for Defendant 
2568 Washington Blvd., Suite 203 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Telephone: (801) 392-8247 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
KERRY B. BAKER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
STIPULATION FOR ENLARGEMENT 
OF TIME TO FILE APPELLANT'S 
BRIEF 
Case No. 920550-CA 
COMES NOW, Bernard L. Allen, Attorney for Defendant and hereby 
moves that pursuant to Rule 26(a), of the Utah Rules of Appellant 
Procedure (1985) , and due to the fact that the Attorney Bernard L. 
Allen is in need of an additional thirty (30) days to complete 
Defendant's brief. That the Defendant/Appellant may have an 
enlargement of tiem in which to file Appellant's Brief from 
November 23, 1992, until December 23, 1992. 
BERNARD Lr^LLEJJ 
Attorney for Appellant 
The State stipulates—tafet—tho appollatn—may—hw* qn—* 
-enlargement of time in which to file his brief;-"— Joes IAO^ o!0]&dt' 
^o offdkvNrs v£r>jL/e^ >i •£*/- OAS^ e^ij{\r^v^ju^i~ <£- S-l<*\4_ r 
2 
fqftsaH flreJan 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
3 
DEC 41992 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
State of Ut|ah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Kerry B. Baker, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
cnan 
Osurt 
ORDER 
Case No. 920550-CA 
This matter is before the court upon appellant's motion 
for extension of time to file the appellant's brief, filed 
November 30, 1992. Appellee does not object to the motion. 
Now therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that appellant is 
granted an extension of time to December 23, 1992, to file 
appellant's brief. 
Dated this ^ ^ d a y of November, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
Norman H. Jac£&&on, J u d g e 
Amend. V CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due proc* 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infair 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in c, 
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual servic 
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the s 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, libt 
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be take: 
public use, without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a sp 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district whereir 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previc 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the ac< 
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compu 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistan 
counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT VII 
[Trial by jury in civil cases.] 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed t\ 
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a 
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, tha 
cording to the rules of the common law. 
AMENDMENT VIII 
[Bail — Punishment.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor 
and unusual punishments inflicted. 
20 
Art. I, § 6 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — The Mootness Ques-
tion in Habeas Corpus Proceedings Where Pe-
titioner Is Released Prior to Final Adjudica-
tion, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 265. 
Habeas Corpus and the In-Service Conscien-
tious Objector, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 328. 
Post-Conviction Procedure Act: Limitation 
on Habeas Corpus?, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 595. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 39 Am. Jur. 2d Habeas Cor-
pus §§ 5 to 7. 
C.J.S. — 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law 
T§ 472 et seq.; 39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 5. 
A.L.R. — Anticipatory relief in federa1 
courts against state criminal prosecutions 
growing out of civil rights activities, 6 
A.L.R.3d 301. 
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law ** 
83(1), 121 to 123. 
Sec. 6. [Right to bear arms.] 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security anc 
defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawfii 
purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legisla 
ture from defining the lawful use of arms. 
History: Const. 1896; L. 1984 (2nd S.S.), 
S.J.R. 3. 
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1983, Senate 
Joint Resolution No. 2, proposing to amen* 
this section, was repealed by Senate Joint Res 
olution No. 3, Laws 1984 (2nd S.S.), § 2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Prospective application. 
Regulation of right to bear arms. 
Prospective application. 
The amendment to this provision by Laws 
1984 (2nd S.S.), Senate Joint Resolution No. 3 
is to be given prospective application only. 
State v. Wacek, 703 P.2d 296 (Utah 1985). 
Regulation of right to bear arms. 
This section gives sufficient authority for th 
legislature to forbid the possession of dangc 
ous weapons by those who are not citizens^ c 
who have been convicted of crimes, or who ai 
addicted to drugs, or who are mentally mcon 
petent. State v. Beorchia, 530 P.2d 813 (Uta 
1974). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — The Individual Right 
to Bear Arms: An Illusory Public Pacifier?, 
1986 Utah L. Rev. 751. 
Am. Jur. 2d, — 79 Am. Jur. 2d Weapons 
and Firearms § 4. 
C.J,S. — 16A C J S . Constitutional Law 
§ 511; 94 C.J.S. Weapons § 2. 
A.L.R. — Gun control laws, validity ar 
construction of, 28 A.L.R.3d 845. 
Validity of statute proscribing possession c 
carrying of knife, 47 A.L R,4th 651. 
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law <*» 8 
Weapons «» 1, 3, 6 et seq. 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due proce* 
of law. 
History: Const 1896. 
Cross-References. — Eminent domain gen-
erally, § 78-34-1 et seq. 
64 
*-lX*U. i , S ±* CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Workmen's Compensation Act is not invalid 
because it delegates to industrial commission 
the power to hear, consider and determine con-
troversies between litigants as to ultimate lia-
bility, or their property rights. Utah Fuel Co. 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 57 Utah 246,194 P. 122 
(1920). 
Dependents of employee killed by acts of 
third party, a stranger to employment, are not 
Utah Law Review. — No-Fault Automobile 
Insurance in Utah — State Constitutional Is-
sues, 1970 Utah L. Rev. 248. 
Comment, The Defense of Entrapment: Next 
Move — Due Process? 1971 Utah L. Rev. 266. 
Comment, The Scope of Fourteenth Amend-
ment Due Process: Counsel in Prison Disciplin-
ary Proceedings, 1971 Utah L. Rev. 275. 
Comment, The Utah Supreme Court and the 
Utah State Constitution, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 
319. 
Outdoor Sports and Torts: An Analysis of 
Utah's Recreational Use Act, 1988 Utah L. 
Rev. 47. 
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judi-
cial Decisions — Constitutional Law, 1990 
Utah L. Rev. 129. 
Am. Jur, 2d. — 16A Am. Jur. 2d Constitu-
tional Law ^ 613 to 617. 
C.J.S. — 16D C.J.S. Constitutional Law 
§§ 1428 to 1437. 
A.L.R. — Exclusion of public from state 
Hi8tory: Const. 1896. 
Cross-References. — Rights of defendants, 
statutory provisions, § 77-1-6. 
limited to recovery under Workmen's Compen-
sation Act exclusively, unless they have as-
signed their rights to insurance carrier. Robin-
son v. Union Pac. R.R., 70 Utah 441, 261 P 9 
(1927). 
Cited in Wrolstad v. Industrial Comm'n, 786 
P.2d 243 (Utah Ct. Aft). 1990)': 
criminal trial in order to preserve confidential-
ity of undercover witness, 54 A.L.R.4th 1156. 
Exclusion of public from state criminal trial 
in order to prevent disturbance by spectators or 
defendant, 55 A.L.R.4th 1170. 
Exclusion of public from state criminal trial 
in order to avoid intimidation of witness, 55 
A.L.R.4th 1196. 
False light invasion of privacy—defenses 
and remedies, 57 A.L.R.4th 244. 
Imputation of criminal, abnormal, or other-
wise offensive sexual attitude or behavior as 
defamation—post-New York Times cases, 57 
A.L.R.4th 404. 
Libel or slander: defamation by statement 
made in jest, 57 A.L.R.4th 520. 
Defamation: designation as scab, 65 
A.L.R.4th 1000. 
Intentional spoliation of evidence, interfer-
ing with prospective civil action, as actionable, 
70 A.L.R.4th 984. 
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law 
s=> 322, 324, 327, 328. 
Sec. 12- [Rights of accused persons,] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear an3 
defend in person and by counsel, to dema ^ the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereci, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense il 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused ? 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not M% 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, ^ H 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
86 
Rule 11 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 11. Pleas. 
(1) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be repre-
sented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The 
defendant may not be required to plead until he has had a reasonable time to 
confer with counsel. 
(2) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by 
reason of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the 
alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant re-
fuses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shal1 
enter a plea of not guilty. 
(3) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
(4) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be 
set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for 
an early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defen-
dant, or his counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a 
jury trial. 
(5) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or no contest, and may 
not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(a) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he has knowingly 
waived his right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(b) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(c) the defendant knows he has rights against compulsory self-incrimi-
nation, to a jury trial, and to confront and cross-examine in open court the 
witnesses against him, and that by entering the plea he waives all of 
those rights; 
(d) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to 
which he is entering the plea; that upon trial the prosecution would have 
the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt; 
and that the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(e) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence that 
may be imposed upon him for each offense to which a plea is entered, 
including the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(f) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; and 
(g) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any 
motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest. 
(6) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion 
to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is not a ground for setting the plea 
aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to make a motion under 
Section 77-13-6. 
(7) (a) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has 
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser in-
cluded offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be 
approved by the court. 
(b) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court 
shall advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to 
sentence is not binding on the court. 
(8) (a) The judge may not participate in plea discussions prior to any agree-
ment being made by the prosecuting attorney. 
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1 THE COURT: Thank you. Then, Mr. Baker, I ask 
2 y o u — f i r s t of all I want to know what your education is. 
3 MR. BAKER: I went to sophomore. 
4 THE COURT: Do you understand—read and 
5 understand the English language? 
6 MR. BAKER: I understand English, yes. 
7 MR. GRAVIS: He doesn't read very well. 
8 THE COURT: Okay. But you have gone through 
9 the plea agreement with Mr. Gravis? 
10 MR. BAKER: Yes. 
11 THE COURT: And you understand that? You have 
12 heard your attorney make statements as to what h e — h e is 
13 telling me what you intend to do. Is there anything 
14 misleading from what he has told me? Is that what you 
15 intend to do? 
16 MR. BAKER: Yes, sir. 
17 THE COURT: Are you under the influence of any 
18 alcohol or drug at this time? 
19 MR. BAKER: No, sir. 
20 THE COURT: Any other kind of health condition 
21 that you may not be thinking too clearly? 
22 MR. BAKER: No. 
23 THE COURT: Are you presently receiving any 
24 kind of medical treatment? 
25 MR. BAKER: No—-yeah. 
1 MR. BAKER: Yes. 
2 THE COURT: You understand that you would have 
3 the right to confront the State's witnesses and call 
4 witnesses that your attorney supplied, in the event he 
5 felt best and you felt best, in your behalf. Do you 
6 understand that? 
7 MR. BAKER: Yes. 
8 THE COURT: Do you understand that at the time 
9 of trial that it would be the obligation of the State to 
10 prove your guilt beyond a reasonable doubt of each of 
11 the elements? 
12 MR. BAKER: Yes. 
13 THE COURT: You understand that? 
14 MR. BAKER: Yes. 
15 J THE COURT: To be convicted of a third degree 
felony, the theft, the prosecution would have to prove 
that you had custody of a TV that was the property of 
18 I Action TV Rental. That it was a value of in excess of 
19 $250.00, but less than $1,000.00. That pursuant to the 
20 I rental or lease agreement that it was not returned in 
the specified time. And in so doing you intentionally 
failed to comply with the terms of that agreement 
23 | concerning the return of that item. You understand that 
each of those elements would have to be proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Do you understand that? 
16 
17 
21 
22 
24 
25 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
there any additional talk you want to have with your 
counsel? 
MR. BAKER: 
THE COURT: 
MR7„BAKER: 
•SHE*. COURT: 
<W&..> BAKER: 
THE COURT: 
No. 
Have-any promises"been made to'you? 
No. 
Mr. Baker? 
No. 
Are you doing this voluntarily, 
without any duress from anyone? 
MR. BAKER: 
THE COURT: 
agreements' \ that ^may 
Yes. 
Do> you understand that any 
have been represented are not 
..biridi'ng" bn-^  this Court in terms of sentencing, you * 
•t&ndeiE'jStandv-that? -
MR. BAKER: 
THE COURT; 
want to ask? 
MR. BAKER: 
THE COURT: 
been—you have been 
MR. BAKER: 
THE COURT: 
Gravis, of what the-
MR. GRAVIS: 
THE COURT: 
Yes. 
Are there any questions that you 
No. 
Are you in fact guilty of what has 
charged with? 
Yes. 
Do you have a statement, Mr. 
-
Yes, your Honor. 
Thank you. I have in front of me, 
(July 29, 1992, Sentence) 
4 
7 
1 
2 
3
 | THE COURT: The State of Utah vs. Kerry Baker 
for sentencing. 
5
 I MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, may we pass that? Mr 
6
 I Baker's attorney is Mr. Allen. He indicates to me that 
he wants Mr. Allen here. I left a message. I will try 
8 I to get Mr. Allen over, unless he is willing to do it 
9
 without Mr Allen. 
10 THE COURT: Thank you. Do you want to wait for 
11 Mr. Allen? 
12 MR. BAKER: I can get it over with now. 
13 THE COURT: Have you had a chance to review it? 
14 MR. GRAVIS: I have, your Honor. Kerry, step 
15 I on down here. 
THE COURT: This is the time set for sentencing 
in this matter. Is there any legal reason that sentence 
should not be imposed? 
MR. GRAVIS: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Daines, would the State like to 
21 | be heard in this matter? 
22
 I MR. DAINES: No, your Honor. 
23 I THE COURT: I have received—requested and now 
24 J received a recommendation from the Department of 
Corrections. I think, Mr. Gravis, you have received a 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
25 
1
 copy of that. Have you had a chance to review that and 
2 review the matter with Mr. Baker? 
3 MR. GRAVIS: Yes, your Honor, I have. 
4
 THE COURT: Is there anything you would like to 
5 say now before I impose sentence? 
6 MR. GRAVIS: No, your Honor. Of course it is 
7 not a very good recommendation. He does have a — h e has 
8 been to prison before. And I think Mr. Jones—Mr. Baker 
9 has some problems that might be addressed by a 
10 diagnostic evaluation. Otherwise, he is just going to 
11 keep repeating as an offender. Maybe there is something 
12 that can be done other than sending him to prison. 
13 THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Baker, is there 
14 anything you want to tell me? 
15 MR. BAKER: Well, Bernie Allen promised me tone 
16 thing, he told me 1^ain't going to prison. And he would 
17 try to get me a work release and do some jail time. If 
18 I do—well,-* go .to prison or a lot of jail time, I ain't 
19 paying no restitution, you know. I did time for it. 
20 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Baker. This is 
21 a—the facts in this situation are normally not those 
22 that would bring about a recommendation and imposition 
23 of prison. However, Mr. Baker, as I look over your past 
24 history, it is filled with violations. You have been to 
25 prison. You have been in and out. I think the staff of 
3 
4 
10 
11 
] the Department of Corrections, that this is the kind of 
2
 ' a case where there is nothing left to do. You have been 
placed in about every program there is. You have been 
through those programs, most of them unsuccessful. You 
5
 I are in a situation now as you violate the law you are 
just going to spend time. There is no other program. 
If you want to get down to the prison and attempt to 
8
 I Put yourself in programs that are going to help you, 
9
 J your rehabilitation now, I think it is up to you. I 
don't think anybody— 
MR. BAKER: I have been there before, your 
12 | Honor. No programs in prison, no programs at all, 
13
 I THE COURT: I think there are others that come 
14
 I out and say that's not correct. But no one is going to 
force you to do that. But I am going to tell you that 
you are now in a situation where you are going to 
prison. When you get out of prison, if you violate the 
law, you are going to go back. The days of trying to do 
something else are over. 
The Court is imposing—sentencing you to spend zero 
to five years in the Utah State Prison. I am also 
22
 | ordering that you pay restitution 
23
 I MR. BAKER: I won't pay no restitution 
24 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
25 
THE COURT: Thank you . Of $ 6 4 1 . 1 4 , 
MR. BAKER: I w o n ' t pay i t . 
